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Abstract—This paper applies channel sounding measurements
to enable physical-layer security coding. The channel measure-
ments were acquired in an indoor environment and used to
assess the secrecy capacity as a function of physical location.
A variety of Reed-Muller wiretap codes were applied to the
channel measurements to determine the most effective code for
the environment. The results suggest that deploying physical-
layer security coding is a three-point design process, where
channel sounding data guides 1) the physical placement of the
antennas, 2) the power settings of the transmitter, and 3) the
selection of wiretap coding.
Index Terms—physical-layer security, channel sounding, wire-
tap coding, Reed-Muller codes
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless transmissions grow more frequent, there is a
corresponding increase in the amount of sensitive information
exchanged over the air. Consequently, the demand for secure
and reliable data transfer is ever expanding. Cryptography
is the traditional method used to provide data confidential-
ity, and it relies on the assumed hardness of mathematical
inverse problems such as the discrete logarithm problem [1]
or factoring large integers [2]. Since the number of possible
keys is much smaller than the number of possible messages,
a brute-force attack can defeat any modern cryptographic
algorithm, even though it may take decades, or longer, to
recover the message [3]. Future advances in mathematics
and computation may render a subset of these cryptographic
algorithms obsolete [4].
The field of physical-layer security [5], [6] has attracted
much attention of late due to the strong information theoretic
security guarantees that are possible to be made [5], [7],
[8]. Approaches to physical-layer security are rooted in both
signaling [9] and coding1 techniques [6], [10], and the extra
security from the physical layer can be added to security
measures already in place at other layers, such as cryptography
at the application layer [11].
Although physical-layer security has many advantages,
much of the theoretical work suffers from assumptions that
are regrettably impractical. This fact has slowed both the de-
velopment of proof-of-concept prototypes and the acceptance
of physical-layer approaches to security in practice [12]. Im-
plementations to date either focus on the distribution of secret
keys [13], or consider techniques that fall short of providing
1Codes of this type are referred to as wiretap, secrecy, or physical-layer
security codes.
information theoretic security, albeit while making reason-
able practical assumptions [14]. One of the chief limiting
assumptions made in almost all theoretical work that makes
achieving information theoretic security difficult in practice
is that the designer must know the channel state information
(CSI), or channel parameters, for both legitimate receivers and
eavesdroppers. While measuring an eavesdropper’s channel
parameters is impossible for some applications, there are cases
where the channel can be learned through channel sounding.
In this paper, we present a methodology for deploying
physical-layer security in a real-world wireless communica-
tion system. The method requires thorough channel sounding
within a controlled environment so as to characterize the
capacity for physical-layer security as a function of the place-
ment of both legitimate antennas and eavesdroppers. Using
the channel sounding measurements, we then show how to
adjust both the power at the transmitter along with the choice
of coding so as to maximize the reliable throughput to a
legitimate receiver without sacrificing security.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II gives the system setup, including the wiretap channel
model and the basic coding approach to physical-layer secu-
rity. Channel sounding procedures are explained in Section III
and basic channel measurements are shown for an indoor
test environment. Section IV presents the secrecy capacity
analysis as a function of physical location of the eavesdropper,
and shows how specific wiretap codes can be deployed to
achieve reasonable rates while providing tandem reliability and
security in the test network. Finally, conclusions and a short
outline of future work are given in Section V.
II. SYSTEM SETUP
We first provide a quick guide to the notation of the paper.
Capital letters represent either random variables or matrices,
which is made clear by context. The lengths of random vectors
are defined by superscripts on the random variables, except
where the notation is cumbersome. Then the size is given
explicitly in the text. The ith random variable in a random
vector is labeled with subscript i. Realizations of random
variables are given by their lowercase equivalents, often with-
out including superscripts for vectors, and constants are also
written as lowercase variables. We also let F2 indicate the
binary field of numbers, and indicate the size of binary vector
spaces over F2 (i.e., vectors or matrices) with superscripts.
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Fig. 1. The wiretap channel model.
A. Wiretap Channel Model
The wiretap channel, developed by Wyner in 1975 [5],
provides a simple model for wireless communication and
assumes three users: Alice, the transmitter; Bob, the intended
recipient; and Eve, a passive eavesdropper. A modern version
of this model is given in Fig. 1. The figure illustrates that Alice
encodes a message M into a codeword Xn, which is then
transmitted to Bob over the main channel of communications.
Bob receives Y n, which may be different from Xn because
of the noise in the channel. He then decodes Y n and gets Mˆ ,
an estimate of M . Eve also receives a noisy version of Xn,
albeit through a separate channel called the eavesdropper’s
channel. Because Eve’s physical position is different from
Bob’s, her observation Zn is assumed to be different from
Bob’s observation Y n. Thus, Eve faces a different challenge
in retrieving the message M , and Alice and Bob design their
encoder to exploit this difference for security.
Since this paper focuses on real-world channel measure-
ments, it may be reasonable to assume that we would consider
the case where both the main and wiretap channels are
Gaussian [15], and we will certainly do this with reference
to the secrecy capacity in Section IV. However, coding for
information theoretic security over the Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel is still an open problem. Although it has been shown to
be possible to code over the Gaussian wiretap channel model
and achieve information theoretic security and reliability in
tandem [16], the only explicit coding techniques designed for
this channel either address security in terms of error rate rather
than information theory [17], [18], or attempt to add additional
layers of coding so that the Gaussian wiretap channel mimics a
discrete memoryless channel (DMC) model instead [19], [20].
For this initial study, we design codes for a discrete mem-
oryless variant of the wiretap channel model, where the main
channel is assumed to be error-free, and the eavesdropper’s
channel is a binary erasure channel (BEC). We justify this
model by noting that several communication systems tend
to give extremely reliable estimates of transmitted data or
seemingly no information whatsoever. Some examples are
packet-based systems with inter-packet interleaving [21], and
systems that deploy modern error-control coding such as low-
density parity-check (LDPC) codes or turbo codes [22]. To be
more specific, we assume a threshold τ in signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) over a Gaussian link, such that
y =
{
x if SNRm ≥ τ
? if SNRm < τ,
(1)
and
z =
{
x if SNRe ≥ τ
? if SNRe < τ,
(2)
where ‘?’ indicates an erasure, SNRm is the SNR over the
main channel, and SNRe is the SNR over the eavesdropper’s
channel. The variables x, y, and z are signals that depict a
single use of the wiretap channel in Fig. 1. Since some symbols
may be erased over the main channel, but the codes assume an
error-free link, we will use channel sounding measurements
on parallel channels to choose only highly reliable carriers
for transmission to Bob. More details on this are given in
Sections III and IV.
The encoder is designed with two constraints in mind,
namely:
1) Pr(M 6= Mˆ) < δr (reliability constraint), and
2) I(M ;Zn) < δs (security constraint).
Here
I(M ;Zn) = H(M)−H(M |Zn), (3)
which is the usual mutual information [23], and H(M |Zn) is
called the equivocation [5]. It is assumed that the statistics
of the message are time invariant, and thus, the entropy of
the message H(M) is a constant. Clearly then, achieving the
security constraint amounts to making I(M ;Zn) small, or
equivalently, making the equivocation large. The constants δr
and δs are chosen by the designer, and are assumed to be
small. Notice that we do not take the traditional asymptotic
approach [5], [8] in the security constraint, but rather consider
the exact amount of mutual information (or equivalently,
equivocation) at the eavesdropper. This approach allows us to
work in the finite blocklength regime, making the results more
appropriate for deployment of physical-layer security systems.
B. Coding for Secrecy
For this paper, messages are assumed to be chosen uni-
formly at random from an alphabet M = {1, 2, . . . , 2k},
and converted to binary messages of k bits each. All codes
considered are binary with blocklength denoted by n. Thus,
the rate of a wiretap code is R = k/n. We consider only
some of the simpler wiretap code structures in this initial
work, i.e., coset coding at finite blocklength [5], [24]. Since the
main channel is assumed to be error-free, we devote the entire
overhead of the code to achieving the security constraint.
Consider an (n, n−k) linear block code C with (n−k)×n
generator matrix G and k×n parity-check matrix H . Let M ′
be an (n−k)-bit auxiliary message that is uniformly distributed
over Fn−k2 . Then the encoding function is given by
xn =
[
m m′
] [G′
G
]
, (4)
where G′ is chosen from Fk×n2 so that its rows form a full
rank matrix when stacked with G. Oftentimes the parity check
matrix H can be used as G′. Since m′ is chosen uniformly at
random, the mapping from m to xn is a one-to-many mapping,
where xn can take on any of 2n−k codewords. The structure
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE WIRETAP CODE WITH BLOCK LENGTH n = 4 AND RATE
R = 1/2.
m \m′ 00 01 10 11
00 0000 1110 0111 1001
01 1011 0101 1100 0010
10 1101 0011 1010 0100
11 0110 1000 0001 1111
of the encoder, however, ensures that every possible xn for a
given m is in the same coset [22] of C, and that the cosets
expand to fill the vector space Fn2 [5], [10], [24].
A simple example will suffice to illustrate this process. Let
n = 4, k = 2,
G =
[
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
]
, (5)
and
G′ = H =
[
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
]
. (6)
The mapping of messages to codewords is then given in
Table I. Note that C is given in the first row of the table,
and each row of the table forms a coset of C.
The decoder amounts to a calculation of the syndrome sk
of the transmitted codeword, i.e.,
sk = ynHT . (7)
Since the main channel is noise-free, yn = xn. There then
exists a mapping from the syndrome to the message, which is
a function of the selection of the matrix G′. In [25], it was
shown that G′ could be chosen to ensure
mk = sk, (8)
although a simple look-up table could provide the mapping
from sk to mk were this not to be the case. Note that for the
example in Table I, the expression in (8) holds.
In designing codes to satisfy the security constraint given
in Section II-A, we will find it convenient to analyze a code
in terms of its worst-case leakage given µ observed coded
bits at the eavesdropper. Note that this is the coding approach
given in the wiretap-II case [26]. To aid in this endeavor,
consider the equivocation matrix [24]. This matrix gives us
a straightforward mechanism for cataloguing the number of
erasure patterns with µ revealed coded bits that maintain a
certain number of bits of equivocation. It was shown in [24]
that wiretap codes based on cosets of a linear block code can
only leak full bits of information, and thus the matrix form of
the equivocation matrix is justified.
In Table II we show the tabular form of the equivocation
matrix for the example code in Table I. Note that the worst-
case equivocation when µ = 2 is one bit, although five out of
six erasure patterns where µ = 2 maintain full equivocation
(i.e., do not leak information). The worst case for µ = 2 is
TABLE II
THE EQUIVOCATION MATRIX FOR THE WIRETAP CODE SHOWN IN TABLE I.
Equivocation Number of
(bits) Revealed Bits (µ)
0 1 2 3 4
2 1 4 5 0 0
1 0 0 1 4 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
when the 2nd and 3rd bits of the transmitted codeword are
revealed to an eavesdropper. Suppose, e.g., that z = (?00?).
Note in Table I that half of the cosets can be ruled out since the
four consistent codewords to this observation indicate that m
is either (00) or (11). Thus, the equivocation is only a single
bit of information, assuming the two remaining messages
to be equally likely. Further note that any observation z
where the middle two bits are revealed will leak one bit of
information to Eve [24]. Thus, we need only count the unique
erasure patterns in the equivocation matrix, rather than all
possible observations, and the worst-case equivocation given µ
observed bits is easily identified when the equivocation matrix
can be formed.
Unfortunately when codes get larger, finding the exact
equivocation matrix can get complicated. In essence, the
number of patterns to check becomes too large to efficiently
produce the entire matrix [24]. Luckily, for several families
of algebraic codes, there exists a shortcut for finding the
worst-case equivocation pattern for all possible µ. In [27],
the generalized Hamming weights of the dual code C⊥ were
shown to indicate the exact µ for which the worst-case pattern
leaks an additional bit of information when compared to
patterns where µ− 1 coded bits are observed. In other words,
the worst-case leakage when µ coded bits are observed is equal
to the number of generalized Hamming weights of C⊥ that are
equal to or less than µ [24], [27].
III. CHANNEL SOUNDING
In this section, we demonstrate how it is possible to learn the
eavesdropper’s channel so as to allow for wiretap code design.
We assume that legitimate and eavesdropper receivers both
use the same receiver hardware. In practice, this indicates that
one should perform the channel sounding experiments with the
highest quality receiver hardware that an eavesdropper may be
expected to use.
A. Environment
The procedure was implemented in the south end of the
fourth floor of the Clyde Engineering Building at Brigham
Young University (see Fig. 2 for the floor map). The area
in which data were gathered is comprised mostly of cinder
block walls, encased in bricks, without any windows. All the
data were gathered indoors. One office was selected as Bob’s
location, which is highlighted in blue in Fig. 2. Adjacent
Fig. 2. Indoor environment where channel sounding measurements were
recorded. Grey rooms represent the potential locations of Eve while the blue
room represents the location of Bob. The transmitter location is indicated by
a red diamond.
offices were used as potential locations for Eve, and these
are highlighted in grey. The transmitter is also indicated by a
red diamond.
B. Procedure
The channel sounding signal used was motivated by
802.11g: OFDM comprising 64 sub-carriers with a sub-
carrier separation of 0.3125 MHz. To avoid interference with
802.11g in the 2400 MHz band, the channel sounding was
performed one octave below, at 1250 MHz. The transmitter
was a software-defined radio (SDR) configured to transmit
64 unmodulated sub-carriers. A modest power amplifier was
attached to the transmitter to increase the signal-to-noise
ratio at the receiver. The receiver was a second SDR that
converted the received RF signal to I/Q baseband and sampled
it at 20 Msamples/s. At each location, 32 periods of the
sounding signal were recorded. The power spectral density of
the channel was estimated using Welch’s method of averaged
periodograms [28] based on length-128 FFTs. The length of
the FFT was twice the number of sub-carriers. The even-
indexed FFT bins corresponded to the sub-carriers and were
used to estimate the channel gains at each sub-carrier. The odd-
indexed FFT bins were used to estimate the noise variance.
The system for the channel sounding experiments is mod-
eled in Fig. 3, as well as the equipment used. The transmitter
was stationary at a height of 200 cm above the floor to
approximate the height of a WiFi access point. The receiver
captured a “snapshot” of the channel on a grid with 10.2
cm spacing. The spacing ensured a less than half wavelength
spatial sampling rate. The receiver height was fixed at 143 cm
above the floor.
C. Basic Channel Sounding Results
Since we performed the channel sounding with the idea of
applying erasure wiretap coding to the data, we present the
SDR
Analog Devices
ADALM-Pluto
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Analog Devices
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Mini Circuits
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Fig. 3. The system used for transmitting and receiving signal data.
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Fig. 4. Heat map of the engineering building showing the number of sub-
carriers such that the signal-to-noise ratio is at least 25 dB.
measurements in terms of the number of the 64 sub-carriers of
the OFDM-like waveform, where a reliable signal is indicated
by the model in (1) and (2) for each sub-carrier. Increasing
the value of the threshold τ in (1) and (2) is equivalent
to reducing the transmit power within the real environment.
Fine-tuning of the τ value we apply to the measurements
indicates careful selection of the transmit power so as to
deliver a signal advantage to Bob over Eve. We chose τ to
heuristically minimize the signal strength in each of Eve’s
potential locations, while maintaining a reasonable amount of
signal strength in Bob’s office, which resulted in τ = 25 dB
for our data set. We optimize this choice of τ later.
Multipath in the indoor environment proved to play a
significant role in determining the utility of specific sub-
carriers. The channel sounding results are illustrated in Fig. 4,
where we see that direct line-of-sight also plays a significant
role in the number of reliable sub-carriers, as we expect. We
see that many of the hallway locations will be necessarily
vulnerable to eavesdropping. In this application, however, we
assume eavesdroppers will not set up their receiving antennas
in the hallway, as this location could be secured through
physical monitoring.
IV. APPLICATION OF CODING TO MATCH THE CHANNEL
Motivated by the results in Fig. 4, we see that Bob’s
receiving location does maintain an advantage in signal quality
over all potential eavesdropping locations. The placement of
the transmit antenna was selected to deliver this advantage. In
this section, we analyze the secrecy capacity of this setup, and
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Fig. 5. Channel capacity as a function of position, where ‘tx’ indicates the
location of the transmitter.
detail the choice of wiretap codes.
A. Channel Capacity
Recall the famous Shannon result for channel capacity over
a Gaussian channel [23], [29] as
C =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P
N
)
, (9)
where PN is the signal-to-noise ratio and C is measured in bits
per channel use. Assume the receiving power is given as Pi
for sub-channel i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 64}, and the noise power for
all sub-channels is N . If the sub-channels are chosen so as
not to interfere with one another, then the total capacity of the
channel is [23]
C =
1
2
64∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
Pi
N
)
. (10)
Note that we do not discuss a power constraint here, but in
this work we carefully select the transmit power to maximize
secure throughput. Applying (10) to the channel sounding
measurements outlined in Section III, we present the capacity
as a function of physical location for all testing sites in Fig. 5,
given our OFDM-like waveform with 64 sub-carriers. The
threshold τ = 27 dB was chosen to maximize the secure
throughput. This figure is zoomed into the tested areas so as
to better view the results, where we see that Bob’s office has
a greater capacity for communication than do all of the other
offices. This implies that one should be able to communicate
both reliably and securely in this environment.
To get a better feel for the advantage in capacity for Bob
over Eve, we consider the secrecy capacity [5], [6]. While
the capacity is the supremum of all rates at which one can
communicate reliably with arbitrarily low bit error rate at
the decoder [29], the secrecy capacity is the supremum of
rates at which one can communicate while satisfying both the
reliability and security constraint to arbitrarily small constants
δr and δs. In the analysis, n is allowed to go to infinity, but we
will later compare these secrecy capacity results with actual
rates of codes achieved for our scenario. It is known that the
secrecy capacity over the Gaussian wiretap channel [6], [15]
is simply the difference of the capacity of the main channel
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Fig. 6. Secrecy capacity as a function of position, where ‘tx’ indicates
the location of the transmitter and ‘rx’ indicates the reference location,
corresponding to the best location in Bob’s office.
and the capacity of the wiretap channel when the difference is
positive, and zero otherwise. Thus, the overall secrecy capacity
when 64 parallel sub-channels are employed is
Cs =
64∑
i=1
max[Cm,i − Ce,i, 0], (11)
where Cm,i is the capacity for the ith sub-channel as measured
at the receiver in Bob’s office, and Ce,i is the capacity of the
ith sub-channel at the eavesdropper’s receiver. Fig. 6 shows the
secrecy capacity assuming 64 sub-channels and the channel
sounding measurements with τ = 27 dB. Bob’s receiver is
set to the location in his office that maximizes his capacity,
and colors at other locations indicate Cs if the eavesdropper’s
antenna were to be placed at that location. Notice that in
the furthest offices from Bob’s, the secrecy capacity is the
highest, while closer offices require lower rates to achieve both
reliability and security. Locations in direct line-of-sight to the
transmitter have Cs ≈ 0, as expected.
B. Reed-Muller Secrecy Codes
For the tests in this paper, we are restricted to code families
for which we know the generalized Hamming weights of
the dual codes, so as to allow us to identify the worst-case
equivocation when the codes are used over our real-world
scenario. Code families with known generalized Hamming
weights given in [27] are essentially restricted to algebraic
codes. The authors of [24] have recently shown strong ev-
idence that both Hamming codes and their duals (simplex
codes) are best for their sizes in terms of maximizing the
equivocation, but the rates of these codes are quite limited.
Reed-Muller (RM) codes were finally chosen for the tests
presented in this paper due to the fact that the rates of length-
n RM codes are essentially evenly spaced between zero and
one. Also, as n gets larger, more RM codes exist; thus giving
a wider range of rate options.
Since the duals of RM codes are RM codes [22], then
knowing the generalized Hamming weights of RM codes is
sufficient to characterize the worst-case equivocation when
these codes are used as the linear block code for the coset-
based wiretap code construction. (See [27] for more on the
nature of the generalized Hamming weights of RM and other
algebraic codes.)
C. Results
We wish to find the RM code that, when used as a wiretap
code, maximizes the throughput of information subject to the
constraint of full equivocation at all possible eavesdropper
locations. Our results are optimistic in terms of throughput
since the analysis assumes the channel sounding measurements
in Fig. 4 hold for all time, which is surely not true in practice.
Furthermore, we assume the thresholding simplification of the
Gaussian channels in (1) and (2), which allow us to achieve
higher rates in the model than Cs over the real channel. This
fact implies that real-world scenarios that can be modeled like
(1) and (2) are more capable of secrecy than the basic theory
may imply. Results for a variety of codes and τ values are
given in Fig. 7. For each value of τ , only the sub-carriers
for which Bob has a reliable link are used. The equivocation
is given in percentage so that all codes can be compared in
the same figure. The rating of 100% equivocation indicates
that I(M ;Zn) = 0. Throughput is given as the rate of the
code multiplied by the number of active carriers, and is thus
measured in bits per channel use. One channel use allows
for all sub-carriers to be used one time. We assume BPSK
modulation on each sub-carrier.
Colors indicate choice of τ , and we quickly see in the figure
that fine-tuning the power at the transmitter is essential to
achieving the highest possible throughput while maintaining
secure communications. The range of τ values presented in
Fig. 7 is 25 dB to 31 dB. Values of τ that are, respectively,
higher or lower than this range indicate cases where reliable
communication to Bob is not possible, or we are transmitting
at such a high power level that no security can be possible
using the physical layer.
Notice that under the assumptions made in the analysis
of this paper, we have several codes that are capable of
maintaining secure data transfer at the 100% level. Assuming
a need for complete secrecy, the best code for our scenario
on the 4th floor of the Clyde Engineering Building is the
RM(u = 1,m = 2) code, where u indicates the order and
m indicates the degree of the RM code [22]. The code is
marked by a black star in Fig. 7, and it achieves 21.75 bits
per channel use of secure throughput when τ = 27 dB. The
minimum secrecy capacity over all possible eavesdropper lo-
cations is only 8.071 bits per channel use, indicating the severe
advantage of the model given by (1) and (2) in increasing our
ability to keep secrets. Thus we see needs to both justify the
model with additional research and study additional models
that make less severe assumptions. The block length of the
“best” code is n = 4, which is much smaller than anticipated.
We believe the optimal code will grow as our analysis takes
into account additional practicalities.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, channel sounding measurements were taken
in an indoor environment similar to what could be found in
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Fig. 7. Graph of throughput versus percent equivocation for different RM
codes and τ thresholds. Different colors signify τ values, with red indicating
τ = 25 dB, and blue indicating τ = 31 dB. Throughput rate is calculated as
the rate of the code under test multiplied by the number of sub-carriers with
SNRm > τ at Bob’s receiver.
a traditional academic or industrial setting. RM wiretap codes
were applied to the data and the worst-case equivocation for
each was used to determine the overall best code for that
specific location and setup, which turned out to be an RM(1,2)
code. Careful placement and fine tuning of the transmitter
power, along with correct choice of the wiretap code were
all shown to be important in maximizing secure throughput
over the real-world communication scenario.
Future work will continue to both justify the channel
modeling approach taken in this paper, and consider additional
channel models that make fewer practical assumptions. Addi-
tional channel sounding measurements can also impart greater
understanding of the distribution of µ, the number of revealed
bits to an eavesdropper, as a function of eavesdropper location.
It is expected that this last enhancement will cause longer
codes to yield higher relative levels of secure throughput when
compared to shorter codes, although perhaps at an additional
cost of coding rate.
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